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A COMMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW UNPLUGGED 
Jeffrey K. Staton∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a familiar rhetorical template around which rule of law papers are 
framed.  It involves a dizzying number of legal scholars, both ancient and 
modern, who remind us of the subject’s gravity and intellectual pedigree.  
Although we may disagree over precisely what defining the concept entails,1 
the contours of the conceptual debate are clearly demarcated, and in any sense, 
the rule of law is normatively appealing.  From economic development2 to 
political order3 and the expansion and protection of human rights,4 aspects of 
the rule of law seem critical to the maintenance of core elements of human 
welfare.  In light of its normative and positive standing, we are informed of the 
dense international network of rule-of-law-reformers, who spend considerable 
resources tracking and advocating institutional change around the globe.5 
Insofar as this template accurately reflects rule-of-law scholarship and 
advocacy, and I believe that it does, it captures succinctly how intimidating the 
rule-of-law project is to anyone who has ever considered whether it just might 
be flawed in some fundamental ways.  To be blunt about it, taking on the rule 
of law means taking on a cadre of academic luminaries, an impressive 
collection of empirical results, and a dense, well-funded, and ideologically 
committed network of policy advocates.  Building a critical argument in the 
context of the template, then, is quite a challenge. 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Emory University. 
 1 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & 
PHIL. 137 (2002) (providing a useful summary of the multiple definitions of the rule of law). 
 2 See Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) (using an instrumental variables approach to present evidence 
that the quality of a state’s formal legal institutions is an important cause of economic development). 
 3 See, e.g., Douglass C. North et al., Order, Disorder, and Economic Change: Latin America vs. North 
America, in GOVERNING FOR PROSPERITY 17 (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Hilton L. Root eds., 2000) 
(suggesting that legal institutions can lower the stakes of holding power, and in that way, reduce incentives to 
capture or maintain control of the state). 
 4 See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998) (observing that an independent judiciary is a necessary, if not sufficient, 
condition for a rights revolution). 
 5 Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH 
OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 4, 10–11 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
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It is precisely this challenge that McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast 
(MRW) take up in The Rule of Law Unplugged.6  In so doing, they raise 
important questions about our ability to guide rule-of-law reform sensibly.  
Their critical goal alone makes the Article worth reading, but the authors also 
promise to construct a clear pathway toward effective rule-of-law advocacy.7  
As they write, the rule of law is not a “vacuous Rorschach test upon which 
legal scholars and reformers simply project their own views about the content 
and purpose of law.  Rather, [they] see the rule of law as expressing a worthy 
aspiration that rightly finds voice in the hard work of good-intentioned 
activists.”8  Yet, reflecting on the critical element of their article, I am left 
questioning whether the constructive enterprise is really what we want to 
consider constructive.  Perhaps, it would be better to think about their second 
goal as reconstructive.  If the argument is sound and if other scholarship, 
which they do not invoke but which suggests similar conclusions, is sound, 
then simply put, we have reason to question how well we can currently 
advocate reform. 
The main problem they raise is a disconnect between conceptual and 
advocacy work on one hand and institutional research on the other.9  My goal 
in this Essay is to ensure that the implications of their argument are placed 
clearly on the table.  Institutional research raises questions about the way that 
we theorize about and measure reform and about the way we hope to learn 
about our models from data.  By calling our attention to the ways in which this 
is so, MRW raise questions about core elements of the science underlying 
reformism. 
The argument suggests a number of alarming implications.  If we are clear 
about what we mean by the rule of law, and if we are faithful to that concept, 
then it is not clear whether we have developed a valid indicator.  It also follows 
that we may not be able to develop one that can be applied equally to all 
communities around the globe.  If we were forced to pay attention to all the 
possible processes underlying the construction of the rule of law, we would 
likely then have to question a key element of reform orthodoxy: that we know 
which institutions to change and how.  We would want to question how much 
we can advance the rule of law via institutional design, especially in particular 
 
 6 Mathew D. McCubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 
EMORY L.J. 1455 (2010). 
 7 See id. at 1458–59. 
 8 Id. at 1459. 
 9 See id. at 1456–58. 
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contexts.  We might even question whether it is possible to design the rule of 
law at all.  What is more, assuming that we can give instructions for how to 
build the rule of law, some strategies for doing so might undermine other core 
societal values.  It is even possible that we may have to advocate the violation 
of some rule-of-law principles in order to construct it.10  To sum up then, if we 
take MRW seriously, we have reason to question the theories around which we 
wrap our reform advice, the measures we use to track it, and the inferences we 
draw from our empirical tests. 
The gap between institutional research and advocacy is in part a failure of 
institutionalists.  If advocates want clear strategies for reform and scholars 
cannot offer them, the two worlds may understandably grow apart.  But it does 
seem that our desire for reform has gotten out in front of the science that 
should support it.  This does not mean that we should scrap the rule of law 
concept or give up on trying to reform states that systematically violate rule of 
law values.  On the contrary, like MRW, I believe strongly that the rule of law 
is a worthy aspiration, and I am optimistic enough to believe that the science 
can catch up to our reform interests.  That said, The Rule of Law Unplugged 
demands that we carefully reconsider the ways that we research the subject and 
ultimately advocate for change. 
The remainder of this Essay is divided in two parts.  Part I identifies the 
target of the MRW critique.  Part II restates their claims, expands on some of 
them, and develops others, which are not stressed in their Article, but which I 
believe advance the conversation.  I conclude by underlining the implications 
of the argument for rule-of-law research and reform and suggest, if only 
briefly, how we might proceed. 
I. THE TARGET 
To appreciate the implications of the argument set forth by MRW, it is 
useful to stress four assumptions on which they believe current reform 
practices are predicated.  First, the rule of law is a universal value, which is 
applicable equally across and within state boundaries and over time.11  Second, 
 
 10 The authors largely put aside another fundamental concern—that we have yet to identify the right 
causal effect of the rule of law on the elements of human welfare that we believe it advances (for example, 
development and human rights).  It may be that the effect is small or non-existent, and we have yet to develop 
an identification strategy that is fully satisfying.  The authors do cite Stephen Haggard, et al., who summarizes 
this debate nicely.  Id. at 1457 n.12 (citing Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic 
Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205 (2008)). 
 11 McCubbins, Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 6, at 1463. 
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the rule of law requires a specific set of institutions and governance 
structures.12  Third, the rule of law is fundamentally antithetical to autocratic 
governance.13  Fourth, the rule of law is more or less easily measured across 
states.14  McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast hors question each of these 
assumptions.  The table below suggests why they seem so plausible. 
The table displays the states with the ten highest and ten lowest rule-of-law 
scores in 2007,15 as measured by the World Bank’s well-known scale.16  The 
columns classify the states’ political regimes according to information 
provided by the Polity IV project.17  Democratic states are listed on the left; 
autocratic states are listed on the right.  States that are believed to have 
independent judiciaries, as indicated by the Henisz and Tate and Keith scores, 
receive stars.18  Three features of the table are immediately striking.  First and 
most obviously, the states at the top and bottom of the rule-of-law scale seem 
appropriately placed, at least relative to each other.  It is hard to imagine an 
argument defending the validity of an indicator in which Denmark and 
Switzerland fall below Chad or Myanmar in 2007, under any concept of the 
rule of law.  Second, the states in the top ten are all democracies, whereas all 
but two states in the bottom ten are autocracies.  Even the low rule-of-law 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1463–64. 
 15 The year 2007 was chosen because it was the last year for which I have available data for all the 
relevant indicators. 
 16 Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 
1996–2008 (World Bank Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978, 2009). 
 17 Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2008, 
POLITY IV PROJECT, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last visited March 2, 2010) (“The 
Polity IV Project . . . [codes] . . . the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of 
comparative, quantitative analysis . . .  The Polity conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant 
qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually 
exclusive forms of governance.”). 
 18 The Henisz measure derives from the Polity IV project’s indicator of executive constraints and the 
measure of law and order according to Political Risk Services (PRS).  Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional 
Environment for Economic Growth, 12 ECON. & POL. 1 (2000) (providing details of the measures).  Henisz 
codes a judiciary as independent if the executive constraints measure is high enough to reflect the presence of 
an independent judiciary and the PRS measure of law and order is sufficiently high as well.  Id. at 27–28.  
Otherwise a judiciary is coded as dependent.  Id.  Insofar as the Polity regime score is a function of the 
executive constraints subcomponent, the Henisz score is clearly endogenous to the measure of democracy.  For 
this reason, I included another measure of judicial independence provided by Tate and Keith.  C. Neal Tate & 
Linda Camp Keith, Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Judicial Independence Globally (Sept. 1, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Emory Law Journal) (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Aug. 30–Sep. 1, 2007, Chicago, Illinois).  The Tate and Keith 
measure is derived from U.S. State Department reports on human right.  Id. at 15–17.  It is a three-category 
ordinal scale (0=dependent; 1=partially dependent; 2= fully independent).  Id. at 17. 
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democracies are borderline cases on the democratic dimension, receiving a five 
on the Polity IV scale, which some scholars might treat as an indicator of 
autocracy.19  Likewise, not a single state in the top ten has a judiciary that is 
notoriously dependent on its government,20 whereas every state in the bottom 
ten possesses a judiciary about which such concerns have been raised.21
 
 19 The Polity IV team suggests treating states with a score at or above six as “democratic” regimes.  
Because the scale is ordinal and includes a large number of categories, it is worth questioning any choice to 
define regime type with respect to a specific threshold, as this strategy has us do. 
 20 Although I will not push the point here, another implication of institutional research on judicial 
independence is that no court is fully autonomous of the political context in which it is situated.  See, e.g., John 
Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
353 (1999).  The claim is relatively non-controversial if we limit ourselves to the developing world, but there is 
also strong evidence of extra-legal influences on judicial decision making in domestic courts as well regarded 
as the German Federal Constitutional Court and supra-national bodies like the European Court of Justice.  See 
GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY (2005); Clifford J. Carrubba et al., 
Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 435 (2008).  In light of this work, the cross-national measures of judicial independence referenced in 
the table  are best thought of as providing rough and relative information on autonomy.  See table infra note 22 
 21 Tate & Keith, supra note 18. 
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Table: The Rule of Law, Democracy, and Judicial Independence (2007)22 
 
 Regime Type 
 Democracy Autocracy 
 
 
 
 
Rule of Law Top Ten 
 
Denmark* 
Norway* 
Switzerland* 
Sweden* 
New Zealand* 
Finland* 
Austria* 
Canada* 
Australia* 
Ireland* 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule of Law Bottom Ten 
 
 
 
Venezuela 
Congo D.R. 
 
 
 
Haiti 
Myanmar 
Guinea 
Sudan 
Central African Republic 
Ivory Coast# 
Zimbabwe 
Somalia 
* An asterisk (*) indicates states whose judiciaries are classified as 
independent by both Henisz as well as Tate and Keith.23 
# The judiciary is coded as independent by the Henisz measure, but not by 
Tate and Keith.24 
This is the kind of empirical information that has been used to support core 
assumptions about the rule of law in the advocacy community.  Indeed, we 
probably did not need the quantitative measures to tell us that democracy, 
judicial independence, and the rule of law hang together to some extent around 
the world.  Any thin historical sense of the institutional histories of Europe and 
Africa would have suggested what is plainly evident in the Table.  
Nevertheless, the table underscores why the MRW task is far from trivial—
 
 22 This table displays the states with the ten highest scores on the World Governance Indicator rule-of-
law scale by regime type as measured by the Polity IV scale, where any state above a score of five is treated as 
a democracy, and all states below five are treated as autocracies.  See Marshall & Jaggers, supra note 17.  
Iceland, Luxembourg, Iraq, and Afghanistan are excluded from the Table for lack of information on regime 
type or judicial independence   
 23 See supra discussion at note 18.  No state other than the Ivory Coast was coded as independent by 
either Henisz or Tate and Keith.  Id. 
 24 See supra discussion at note 18. 
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they are challenging a conventional wisdom grounded in a number of 
indisputable historical facts.  At first blush at least, the data give no reason to 
question the notion that the rule of law is tightly linked to democracy, that an 
independent judiciary—among other institutional features—is essential to its 
promotion, or much less that we can measure the core concept at issue.25 
Despite what the table suggests, the correlation between the Polity IV 
democracy score and the World Bank rule-of-law indicator for all available 
years turns out to be only .45 (.40 in 2007),26  This is a level of association that 
seems consistent with a positive link between the rule of law and democracy, 
but far from an essential one.  Further, Esarey and Sarkari also find that the 
relationship between the rule of law and democracy is likely curvilinear.27  As 
they write, the “rule of law is strongest in the most autocratic and the most 
democratic states.”28  This result suggests either that the indicator is not 
tapping into the rule of law concept reformers have in mind, which calls into 
question the fourth assumption, or that autocracy and the rule of law are not 
incompatible, which calls into question the third assumption.  And, of course, 
nothing in this simple exercise can speak to the process by which the rule of 
law is constructed, much less whether there are reasons to believe that 
particular institutional arrangements are required.  So, despite initial 
appearances, it is unclear whether we should accept without criticism the core 
underlying assumptions identified by MRW. 
II. THE CLAIMS 
McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast advance three principle claims about 
rule-of-law-reformism.  First, they argue that any useful concept of the rule of 
law must take into account substantive values, incorporate a normative theory 
of law, and clarify how the dimensions of the concept are to be valued.29  
Second, they suggest that the rule of law must be measured appropriately in 
light of this concept.30  Third, they contend that reform advice must be subject 
to careful scientific inquiry.31  This will require a good theory of institutional 
 
 25 For a discussion of common measures of the rule of law, see Svend-Erik Skaaning, Measuring the 
Rule of Law, 63 POL. RES. Q. 449 (2010). 
 26 Justin Esarey & Neza Sakari, Political Stability, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Political Institutions 8 
(Jan. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Emory Law Journal). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See McCubbins, Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 6, at 1458. 
 30 Id. at 1458–59. 
 31 Id. at 1459. 
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reform as well as empirical evidence, which is consistent with the predictions 
from that theory. Any theory of that sort, they argue, will likely require that 
reformers confront a series of tradeoffs of institutional design.  On their face, 
none of these claims are particularly controversial.  They are merely asking 
that rule-of-law advocacy be connected to scientific values.  In practice, 
however, the implications of such a move turn out to be consequential for 
reformism. 
A. The Rule of Law Requires Substance and a Theory of Law 
McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast argue primarily that any useful 
concept of the rule of law must be connected to minimal substantive values and 
married to a normative theory of law.32  Beyond its core procedural features, 
which might be derived from Fuller’s list (e.g., clarity, transparency, 
generality, stability) and which allow individuals to be guided by the law, the 
rule of law dictates that “society should have decent confidence that their 
expressed desires should be accommodated and respected by their 
representatives.”33  If we accept this conceptual assessment, the implication for 
the rule-of-law project is immediate.  In order to sustain the assumption that 
the rule of law is a universal value, which is applicable equally across the 
globe and over time, we now have to come to an agreement on what constitutes 
an appropriate link between societal values and the policies pursued by leaders. 
There is a strong and a weak version of this point’s implication.  Under the 
strong version, where we might insist that the connection between societal 
values and policy outputs should be chosen via some sort of democratic 
process, MRW’s point considerably frustrates the effort to measure the rule of 
law.  Fundamental results derived from the theory of collective choice raise the 
question whether any normatively appealing rules for aggregating individual 
preferences can ensure that social choices are stable and free from 
manipulation.34  Within this tradition, it is unclear how we could come to an 
agreement on what constitutes an “appropriate connection” between 
underlying individual values and policy outputs, or whether any society could 
meet our ideal.  Articulating this standard is going to be especially problematic 
since we are asking for a connection between societal values and policies 
 
 32 Id. at 1471. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); Richard 
D. McKelvey, Intransivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 
12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).   
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across multiple rule-of-law dimensions.  If we cannot come to an agreement 
about what the right connection would look like, we will have to jettison our 
efforts to measure the rule of law.  And if we do that, we threaten removing the 
rule of law from the realm of scientific inquiry.  If this is what MRW have in 
mind, it is difficult to see how to reconstruct our measurement strategy. 
A weaker implication of the point is possible, though.  Perhaps MRW 
simply wish to say that the rule of law requires some minimal commitment to 
outcomes that are substantively fair.  If we can agree on, say, a fundamental, 
universal notion of fairness, then we can sustain the assumption that the rule of 
law is a universal value.  Yet, if we are willing to admit that there can be at 
least some variance across cultures and communities with respect to what is 
fair, then it is again hard to sustain the notion that the rule of law can be a 
universal value. 
The claim that a normative theory of law must be married to the rule-of-law 
concept further complicates the effort to sustain the universality assumption.  If 
we connect a theory of law to the rule of law, we immediately confront 
tensions between rule-of-law values themselves.  The most obvious example 
involves how we should evaluate the possibility of replacing a legal standard 
with a rule.  Whereas the rule might advance the rule-of-law value of “clarity,” 
the doctrinal disruption associated with replacing a vague standard with a clear 
rule undermines the rule-of-law value of “stability.”  How we evaluate this 
tradeoff seems inextricably linked to our understanding of what law should be. 
Although I am persuaded by MRW’s first two conceptual claims, they are 
far from unassailable.  McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast may very well be 
right about the substantive nature of the rule of law and the corresponding need 
to link it to a normative theory of law, but these claims target the substance of 
the concept rather than its clarity, which is of greater concern to the remainder 
of their argument.  A perfectly reasonable response is that the rule of law is a 
procedural concept, regardless of MRW’s interest in making it substantive.  
The real bite in their conceptual argument lies with the final claim they proffer: 
If we want to measure the rule of law appropriately, we are going to have to 
clarify how we value the different dimensions of the concept.35  It is with this 
point in mind that I turn to their measurement claim. 
 
 35 McCubbins, Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 6, at Part II: Measuring the Rule of Law. 
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B. The Rule of Law Must Be Measured 
It is hard to imagine a less controversial claim than that the rule of law 
must be measured.  To appreciate its value, we must wed it to MRW’s final 
conceptual point—that rule-of-law concepts do not explicitly articulate the 
relationships between sub-dimensions.36  Raz’s concept provides an immediate 
example.37  He contends that the rule of law “has two aspects: (1) that people 
should be ruled by the law and obey it, and (2) that the law should be such that 
people will be able to be guided by it.”38  The focus of his analysis is on the 
second condition, on what is required for people to be guided by law.  But the 
first condition is no less important.  Thus, the question arises: How do we 
value the extent to which individuals follow the law in practice relative to the 
extent to which it is possible for them to do so?  We can ask the same of 
Fuller’s list of appropriate characteristics of the law.39  How should we value 
generality relative to clarity?  If there is a conflict between a general statement 
of law and a clear statement, how do we evaluate the tradeoff?  Insofar as the 
world is awash with examples of vague but general laws40 and insofar as 
individuals and public officials alike commonly violate what are undoubtedly 
clear rules, these questions are far from abstract or inconsequential. 
The essential idea is that moving from the typical list-making activity, 
which is associated with defining the rule of law, to an operational measure of 
the concept requires a statement about the hierarchy of elements on the list.  If 
the sub-dimensions are in tension with each other, the task becomes harder 
still.  Even if the statement MRW is looking for is that each dimension of the 
rule of law (e.g., generality, stability, social order) is as important as any other, 
the statement must be explicit.  It is important to stress why. 
Imagine that our measurement goal is to develop a one-dimensional 
indicator of the rule of law, like that produced by the World Bank and 
described in the table.  If our concept is really multidimensional, then our 
measurement task is going to require that we aggregate information across 
several dimensions.  And absent a statement about the relative importance of 
 
 36 Id.  
 37 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 213 (2d ed. 2009). 
 38 Id. 
 39 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). 
 40 For a discussion about vagueness in the law, see Timothy Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, 7 
LEGAL THEORY 379 (2001).  On the incentives for legislators to construct vague law, see JOHN HUBER & 
CHARLES SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY (2002). 
STATON GALLEYSFINAL 10/8/2010  3:09 PM 
2010] COMMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW UNPLUGGED 1505 
the dimensions, it is impossible to validate whatever measure we derive.  
When one aggregation choice is as good as any other, it becomes impossible to 
know whether a particular aggregation choice is appropriate.  We need not 
even restrict ourselves to the assumption that the rule of law is a linear or even 
a smooth function of the underlying dimensions.  We might imagine that there 
are many combinations of the rule-of-law traits, which result in a context that 
we would like to describe as reflecting the rule of law.41  But what we cannot 
do is merely say “we know the rule of law when we see it.” 
In light of the aggregation issue, it is worth returning to the World Bank’s 
measure, which aggregates information from individual and expert surveys, 
credit rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and selected states.42  
The central measurement problem the team tackles involves how to weight the 
information provided by each source about each state for each year when there 
is a lack of agreement across the sources.  This is a tricky aggregation problem 
for sure.  The estimates they derive are the product of a statistical model, 
which assumes that the information from the sources all provide information 
on the latent trait (i.e., the rule of law), and which allows the team to sort out 
stronger signals about that trait from noisier ones.  Critically, although this 
approach is appropriate given the problem the team identifies, it is quite a 
different aggregation problem from that which I have been discussing.  The 
world governance indicators approach makes no explicit conceptual choice 
about the relationship among underlying dimensions.43  And the sources 
provide information on multiple elements of the rule of law—from confidence 
in the police to land rights and beliefs in judicial impartiality.44  This feature of 
the measure sheds some light on the curvilinear relationship between 
democracy and the rule of law, which leads back to the findings of Esarey and 
Sarkari.45  If we value social order or crime equally with the enforceability of 
contracts or the impartiality of the judiciary, we should expect to observe 
authoritarian states with reasonably high rule-of-law scores, particularly ones 
 
 41 For example, we might imagine that a community where the law is typically vague but general and 
largely obeyed is just as much a “rule-of-law community” as one where the law is typically clear, but highly 
specific to individuals and occasionally disregarded.  It is not so much that this must be true, but rather that it 
is possible under some concept of the rule of law. 
 42 Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 
for 1996–2008, at 12–13 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4978, 2009) (on file with Emory 
Law Journal). 
 43 See Governance Matters 2009: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2008, WORLD BANK GROUP, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp (last visited June 12, 2010). 
 44 See Kaufmann et al., supra note 42, at 39–71. 
 45 Esarey & Sakari, supra note 26, at 25–27. 
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that repress dissent yet control crime (e.g., Singapore or perhaps Chile under 
Pinochet).  Whether that is what we mean by the rule of law is an open 
question.  And the openness of the question is a problem. 
C. Reformism Must Be Better Connected to Research 
McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast write, “[R]ule-of-law reform must 
contemplate the relationship between means and ends.  A satisfactory 
understanding of this relationship requires positive theory and empirical 
support, not merely normative leaps of faith or ipse dixit.”46  The authors 
remind us that key lines of research on elements of the rule of law highlight the 
role of political context and require designers to confront difficult tradeoffs.  
The authors develop this argument most forcefully in the context of the debate 
over the unitary executive and the separation of powers.47  I will stress these 
points in the context of work on judicial independence.  I divide this section in 
two parts.  In the first, I consider the extent to which we believe that judicial 
independence is designable.  In the second, I assume that is, and ask how we 
should go about it. 
1. Political Context and the Emergence of Independent Courts 
The first challenge to our ability to construct the rule of law via judicial 
independence is that judicial independence depends on features outside a 
state’s legal system.  A body of scholarship has proposed, and provided 
evidence to support, the notion that independence depends on features of 
political context, most notably, government fragmentation.48  When the set of 
officials with control over judicial resources or whose participation is required 
for the faithful implementation of judicial decisions are limited by explicit or 
implicit vetoes from other officials, judges are freed to resolve decisions 
consistently with their sincere evaluations of the record.49  Unfortunately, 
though fragmentation can be designed, or at least encouraged, via carefully 
selected electoral institutions, it is unclear whether we should advocate such a 
change because fragmentation is also associated with inefficient social 
 
 46 McCubbins, Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 6, at 1459. 
 47 Id. at 1486–89. 
 48 See REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDICIAL POLITICS IN 
ARGENTINA (2004); Julio Ríos-Figueroa, Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary 
in Mexico, 1994–2002, 49 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 31 (2007). 
 49 Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 48, at 31–57 (observing that the Supreme Court of Mexico Court is far more 
likely to strike down national laws under periods of divided government than periods of unified government). 
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spending,50 and perhaps of greater concern, regime instability.51  Thus, 
increasing fragmentation might encourage judicial independence, but for 
related reasons, pork and the propensity for political disorder would also 
increase. 
Other sources of judicial independence are not designable, even indirectly.  
For example, scholars have suggested that a deep public commitment to the 
institutional integrity of the judiciary is a necessary condition for courts to 
constrain government behavior.52  Still others have suggested that if public 
belief in judicial legitimacy is necessary to constrain government, the conflicts 
courts resolve will have to be transparent.  Where the public is unaware of 
government activities, public pressure can be no constraint.53  On this account, 
the promotion of judicial independence will involve a clear strategy for 
building judicial legitimacy and perhaps ensuring clear and accurate media 
coverage of the law.  More problematic is that in some political contexts, 
transparency and judicial legitimacy may be in tension with each other.  If the 
legitimacy theory account is correct, then transparency triggers the public 
pressure needed for independent judging.  And for this reason, judges have 
strong incentives to invite and shape media coverage.54  But if judges face 
significant political pressures in particular cases, which overwhelm whatever 
source of power they might derive from legitimacy and undermine 
independence, then transparency will only expose the public to non-
independent judicial behavior.  That kind of information can undermine 
legitimacy beliefs.55 
Of perhaps greater importance for our interests in promoting rule-of-law 
reform are the growing accounts of judge-led efforts to construct judicial 
independence, which posit that courts can gain autonomy over time by using 
 
 50 See generally Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the 
Industrial Countries, 8 ECON. POL’Y 99 (1989). 
 51 See generally Matt Golder, Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
34 (2006); Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 198 
(1993). 
 52 See James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 
(1998); Matthew C. Stephenson, Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial 
Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 379 (2004). 
 53 See generally VANBERG, supra note 20. 
 54 See generally RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS (1994). 
 55 See generally JEFFREY K. STATON, JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO 
(2010). 
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careful strategies of prudence.56  Consider Ginsburg, who has evaluated court-
building projects in contexts as distinct as the United States, South Korea, and 
Taiwan.57  According to Ginsburg’s account, managing political pressures in a 
court’s infancy—by not asking the government to implement unacceptable 
policies when it would simply ignore such orders or attack the bench—can 
help courts simultaneously avoid political clashes that raise questions about 
independence and subtly induce a norm of compliance.58  By pursuing this 
strategy over time, judges ultimately expand the boundaries of their authority 
and evolve into powerful, independent actors.  The empirical evidence in 
support of this mechanism is historical in nature, but it has proven difficult to 
test the model in a systematic way either on field data or in the laboratory.  But 
if the idea is right, the implication for reform is significant.  We may advance 
the rule of law via judicial behavior that clearly violates core rule-of-law 
values.  The strategy of prudence requires the incremental exercise of judicial 
authority.  If Ginsburg is right, our reform interests require that we ask 
questions of the following sort: How long must a court engage in the Ginsburg 
strategy before it can begin resolving cases sincerely?  Will this kind of 
strategy strain efforts to build judicial legitimacy?  And if it does, what amount 
of legitimacy is worth building a norm of compliance?  Is that even possible? 
2. Judicial Rules and Judicial Behavior 
What if we assume that though contextual influences like fragmentation or 
judicial legitimacy matter at the margin, we can nevertheless construct judicial 
independence via institutional design?  This assumption would require us to 
confront our uncertain knowledge about the link between rules and behavior. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that if we can induce independence via 
institutional design, it will be through the rules that insulate judges from 
external political interference.  These rules include fixed, relatively long 
tenure, budgetary autonomy and multilateral appointment procedures, among 
others.59  Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is far from consistent with this 
pathway.  Consider the figure below, which shows zero-order correlations 
 
 56 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 73 (2003); Clifford J. Carrubba et al., 
Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 71 J. POL. 1 
(2009). 
 57 GINSBURG, supra note 56. 
 58 Id. at 90–96. 
 59 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE (1991). 
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between Ríos-Figueroa’s detailed measure of constitutional provisions for 
judicial insulation in Latin American states from 1945 to 2005, and seven 
measures of de facto judicial independence.60  A diamond indicates the result 
for democracies and a circle indicates the result for all states in the region.  The 
associations are obviously quite small—a few are even negative.  On the 
whole, there would appear to be no direct relationship between formal 
constitutional rules and judicial behavior, at least among this sample of Latin 
American states.  Yet, these are just zero-order correlations; perhaps a well-
specified, theoretically informed model would suggest different results.  
Alarmingly, however, scholars lack consensus about the influence of formal 
institutions on judicial behavior.  Although there are some studies 
demonstrating a positive relationship between de jure and de facto judicial 
independence, as estimated by expert surveys,61 studies that have focused 
explicitly on judicial behavior—as captured by actual decisions in real 
controversies—and on particular courts rather than general impressions about 
the system commonly fail to uncover a connection.62 
  
 
 60 See Andrea Pozas-Loyo & Julio Ríos Figueroa, Enacting Constitutionalism: The Origins of 
Independent Judicial Institutions in Latin America, 42 COMP. POL. 293 (2010). 
 61 See Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence, 27 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 269, 282–88 (2007). 
 62 See Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial Review 
in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422 (2003). 
STATON GALLEYSFINAL 10/8/2010  3:09 PM 
1510 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
Figure: Judicial Rules and Judicial Behavior in Latin America63 
One unsurprising explanation for these results is that there is little 
relationship between formal rules and judicial behavior.  Informal norms are 
far more important.64  Another possible explanation is that the relationship 
between formal rules and behavior is highly dependent on political conditions 
like divided government.65  In contrast, Gretchen Helmke and I have argued 
that a single formal rule can incentivize two very different kinds of behaviors.  
Consider judicial tenure.66  Ostensibly, the logic behind fixing and increasing 
 
 63 This figure displays zero-order correlations between Ríos-Figueroa’s measure of formal constitutional 
provisions designed to create judicial independence and behavioral measures of judicial independence for 
eighteen Latin American states between 1945 and 2005.  A circle indicates the result for all states; a diamond 
represents the result for democracies. 
 64 DANIEL M. BRINKS, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN LATIN AMERICA: INEQUALITY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2008). 
 65 Andrea Pozas-Loyo & Julio Ríos-Figueroa, When and Why ‘Law’ and ‘Reality’ Coincide?  De Jure 
and De Facto Judicial Independence in Chile and Mexico, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 
A DEBATE 168, 178–197 (P. Sabiha Khanum ed., 2008). 
 66 See Gretchen Helmke & Jeffrey K. Staton, The Puzzle of Judicial Politics in Latin America: A Theory 
of Litigation, Judicial Decisions and Inter-Branch Conflict, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA (Gretchen Helmke 
& Julio Ríos-Figueroa eds., forthcoming Dec. 2010). 
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judicial tenure is that job security lowers the incentive for a judge to curry 
favor with politicians who enjoy control over her post.  Yet, insofar as the post 
itself is valuable, life tenure raises its value by increasing the stream of perks 
and privileges associated with the seat.  As long as there are ways to remove 
judges—even judges with life tenure—lengthening the term of employment 
can also increase incentives for prudence.67  For this reason, and especially in a 
context of political conflict where impeachment or imprisonment are 
meaningful possibilities, increasing tenure simultaneously advances judicial 
independence by increasing job security and undermines judicial independence 
by increasing the value of the seat. 
This argument has clear implications for research design.  If rules induce 
competing behavioral incentives, then behavioral studies that make use of field 
data will not be able to sort out the competition easily.  A study using cross-
national measures of constitutional rules governing judicial insulation to 
estimate variance in judicial behavior will find it challenging to pull apart 
judicial incentives associated with the same rule.  A study using cross-national 
expert opinions of the many courts in a system will only compound the 
problem.  To properly sort out the effects of judicial institutions, we are likely 
going to have to move to experimental research designs. 
D. Implications 
I conclude by stressing the key implications of the MRW argument.  First 
and foremost, if we are unwilling or unable to state clearly how it is that we 
value the sub-dimensions of the rule of law, we cannot develop a valid 
indicator.  Thus, until we formulate a coherent concept, even the most basic 
effort to describe the rule of law globally will result in an unclear picture. 
Second, the multidimensionality of the concept calls into question whether 
it should be conceptualized independently of context.  People might reasonably 
disagree over whether their community values legal clarity more than equity, 
or generality more than systematic compliance.  It even seems reasonable to 
ask whether one might value a commitment to social order at the expense of 
arbitrary governance.  Of course, current measures do not allow us to observe 
precisely how states have made these tradeoffs in practice, and it is unclear 
 
 67 Removal can be through constitutional or extra-constitutional means, of course.  Yet as we look 
around the world, it is clear that both approaches have been used to remove particular judicial obstacles to 
political coalitions.  See GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND 
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (2005). 
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whether policy advocates are pursuing the matter on the ground.  The 
commitment to a universal notion of the rule of law would seem to preclude 
such a strategy, but there are good reasons to question this universality. 
Third, and quite critically, it is unclear whether advocacy programs are 
incorporating lessons from institutional research on those aspects of the state 
that are allegedly essential to the rule of law.  I have focused on judicial 
independence.  For the most part, our understanding of how specific 
institutional rules influence judicial behavior is guided by conventional 
wisdom, not careful theory.  And the empirical record testing the conventional 
wisdom is extremely mixed.  As we have begun to develop more sophisticated 
accounts of these rules, we have learned that they create competing incentives 
for judicial behavior.  These accounts suggest the need for research designs 
that are different than those currently in vogue, which rely on time-series, 
cross-sectional regression techniques applied to field data.  Although 
institutions believed to promote judicial independence are just one element of 
the suite of rules associated with the rule of law, they are pretty consequential 
ones.  The implication is that we should question how resolutely we can claim 
that we know what rules are required to promote the rule of law and why. 
Fourth, it is possible that the marginal effect of institutional design on the 
construction of the rule of law is terrifically small relative to other strategies.  
Yet, it may be that indirect approaches to building the rule of law (say by 
incentivizing more fragmented government) risks causing other socio-political 
failures.  For this reason, reformers must have some way of evaluating 
corresponding tradeoffs, and we should accept that different communities 
might evaluate their tradeoffs differently.  Finally, a stream of research on the 
construction of the rule of law suggests that judges may have to violate core 
rule-of-law tenets in order to build it.  It is unclear precisely how this should be 
done, and advocating such a strategy in the context of the broader rule-of-law 
narrative is bound to be uncomfortable.  It will certainly prove challenging. 
In summary, the rule-of-law concept involves measurement challenges that 
have yet to be solved.  Our theories about its construction suggest that we may 
not be able to design it directly, and if we can, we may have to balance that 
against other values and political goals.  These are pretty serious implications.  
We find ourselves in a position to question much of the template around which 
rule-of-law scholarship is framed. 
What should we do about this?  Aside from a general call to address these 
problems and a request for the reform community to more tightly link their 
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recommendations to the scientific record, MRW are largely vague.  In my 
view, a reasonable preliminary step would involve carving up the dimensions 
of the rule of law.  Although the focus on the aggregate concept and its 
aggregate measures is alluring, its multidimensional nature asks a lot of an 
empirical researcher.  Perhaps it asks too much.  Instead of studying the rule of 
law in toto, we might study its sub-dimensions more carefully. 
Of course, this is already being done.  It is the relative quality of extant 
work on corruption or property rights or police professionalism that seems to 
induce a sense that we can combine lessons from each of these fields and 
easily develop a coherent science of the whole.  However, we have yet to take 
many of the necessary preliminary steps on the road to a coherent theory of the 
rule of law.  Most obviously, before we can ask how to sequence a series of 
major institutional changes, we really must understand institutional effects 
better than we do.  Doing this right may require that we de-emphasize our 
efforts to develop international scales of expert opinions or to collect cross-
national maps of constitutional rules, and instead focus on the development of 
careful theoretical claims to be tested in the laboratory.  If we want good 
answers to our questions, it seems crucial that we slow down and rescale our 
work. 
